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Bogard: Bogard: Juvenile Law--Waiver of Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court

COMMENTS
JUVENILE LAW-WAIVER OF
JURISDICTION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION

At common law no distinction was made between an adult criminal
and a juvenile criminal if the juvenile had reached the age of criminal
responsiblity. 1 The procedures for arrest, indictment, trial, and
punishment were identical. 2 Beginning in 1899 with the passage of the
first modern juvenile act in Illinois, 3 American jurisdictions took a new
approach to juvenile crimes. The ideas of social reformers and social
scientists, that children should not be subjected to criminal punishment
and that the causes of criminal or anti-social behavior, particularly of the
young, could be identified and corrected, were fused into the legal concept of parens patriae. 4 The concept developed that where a juvenile's
parents failed to exercise control over his behavior, the state had a responsibility to act as a surrogate parent and to correct the juvenile's deviant behavior. 5
In recent years, this philosophy has come under increasing attack.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice concluded that the "great hopes originally held for the juvenile
courts have not been fulfilled." 6 Despite this criticism, for a juvenile
guilty of conduct which but for the juvenile code would be a felony, the
juvenile system is probably preferable to the adult criminal justice sys7
tem.
1. The age of criminal responsibility was seven in some jurisdictions, ten in
others, with a chance of escape up to the age of twelve if the child was lacking in
mental and moral maturity. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104,
106 (1910).
2. Id. at 106.
3. Rendleman, Parens Patriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L.

R.Ev. 205 (1971).
4. See generally Winnet, Fifty Years of the Juvenile Court: An Evaluation, 36 A.B.

A. J. 363 (1950); Lipsitt, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile
Justice System, 49 BOSTON U.L. REv. 62 (1969).
5. See Mack, supra note 1, at 107.

6. THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7 (1967).
7. Thus, for example David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia, a prominent critic of juvenile justice systems, still
argues that they should be maintained, albeit reformed. See Bazelon, Beyond
Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. J. 42, 45 (1970).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

In virtually all juvenile codes there is a statutory provision allowing
particular juveniles to be tried as adults.8 The more serious the crime,
the more advantages the juvenile justice system offers to an offender.'
However, it is precisely when a juvenile has committed a serious crime
that he is most likely to be tried as an adult. 10
The decision to try a juvenile as an adult represents an abandonment of the ideals of the juvenile system. The consequences for the
juvenile may be serious: incarceration, both pre- and post-conviction, is
likely to be under harsher conditions than within the juvenile system; the
juvenile will undergo the stigmatization of a public adult criminal trial,
even if he is ultimately found innocent of the alleged crime; the length
of commitment may be longer, if the crime is a serious one; and, the
emphasis on treatment during incarceration is likely to be less than
within the juvenile system.
It should be noted that there may be advantages to a juvenile in
being tried as an adult: the chances of obtaining a favorable verdict may
be enhanced in an adult criminal court because the right to a jury trial
exists and more formal court procedures are enforced; the length of his
actual commitment is likely to be shorter than the indefinite commitments possible under juvenile codes if the charge in the criminal court is
a minor one; and the juvenile will have a right to bail if he is tried as an
adult, which he does not have if he is tried as a juvenile. Although these
factors may be important to a juvenile, 11 transfer out of the juvenile
system normally is initiated when the defendant is accused of a serious
crime. Therefore, 'he normally will not agree with a decision that he be
tried as an adult, because of the chance of a much longer commitment
after conviction.
II.

THE MISSOURI STATUTORY SCHEME

Section 211.03 1, RSMo 1969, vests the juvenile court with original
and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings where a juvenile is alleged to
8. Apparently all American Jurisdictions have a statute allovling a juvenile to
be tried as an adult with the exception of New York and Vermont. See NATIONAL
JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LAW AND TAcTIcs INJUVENILE

CAsEs 251 (2d ed. 1974).

9. Note that in this respect the brunt of the attack upon juvenile justice
systems has been largely directed at their involvement with so called "status offenses," that is conduct which would not be criminal except for the offender's
age, and not at its jurisdiction over juvenile felons. See Bazelon, supra note 7, at
42.
10. Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A Policy Statement, 8
CRIME AND DEUNQUENCy

3, 10-11 (1962).

11. An issue not dealt with herein is whether a juvenile has a right to initiate
a hearing to determine if he should be tried as an adult. The new Missouri
Juvenile Court Rules suggest that although the juvenile may petition the court,
the decision of whether to initiate proceedings lies with the Juvenile Judge. Mo.
Juv. CT.

R. 118.01 and comments thereto.
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have violated a state law. A juvenile charged with a crime in a circuit
court properly should move for dismissal of the charge for want of
jurisdiction. A limited statutory exception to the general rule of section
211.031 is made by section 211.071, RSMo 1969. Under that section the
juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction if it finds that the juvenile is at
least fourteen years of age, that the acts which he is alleged to have
committed would have been a crime if he were an adult, and that he is
"not a proper subject to be dealt with" under the juvenile code. It should
be observed that waiver of juvenile jurisdiction does not automatically
subject the juvenile to criminal prosecution, nor can the juvenile court
compel prosecution.' 2 The procedure of section 211.071 merely provides for waiver of the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court so that
criminal prosecution may be commenced.
The Missouri statute must be read in conjunction with the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States."

In Kent

the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction was held to be a "critically important action determining vitally important statutory rights of the
juvenile." 1 4 As such, the juvenile was entitled to a hearing and a statement of the reasons for transfer out of the juvenile system. The reviewing court "should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it
a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a
statement of the relevant facts." 15 Since Kent, there has been controversy whether the requirements there laid down are constitutionally
necessary or were merely the product of an interpretation of the District
of Columbia statute.' 6 However, the Missouri Supreme Court has held
repeatedly that the requirements of Kent apply to the application of the
17
Missouri statute.
III. THE WAIVER HEARINGS

At a waiver hearing, the juvenile's counsel may present a wide range
of evidence to show that the juvenile court should retain its jurisdiction.
12.
(1973).
13.
14.
15.
16.

State v. Ford, 487 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 561.
The Court noted that the District of Columbia statute "gives the Juvenile

Court a substantial degree of discretion

..

." but that

"[it does not confer ... a

license for arbitrary procedure." Id. at 553. The Court's use of this language plus
a general recognition that there is not a constitutional right to be tried as a
juvenile has led many to the condusion that Kent is merely statutory in its prescriptions. See Note, Sending the Accused Juvenile to Adult Criminal Court: A Due
Process Analysis, 42 BRooKusn L. Rnv. 309, 320 (1975).
17. State ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. En Banc 1974). See also
State ex rel. D-V- v. Cook, 495 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1973); State ex rel. Arbeiter v.
Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. En Banc 1968); State v. Williams, 473 S.W.2d
382 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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A showing that the juvenile is not fourteen years of age or that the
alleged act or acts would not have been a crime if committed by an adult
should, according to section 211.071, bar a juvenile court from waiving
its jurisdiction.
In most situations these conditions are verified prior to the hearing
and are not contested. The central issue at most waiver hearings is
whether the juvenile is a "proper subject" to be dealt with under the
juvenile code. Evidence of the juvenile's past involvement with police
and juvenile authorities, of mitigating circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of the crime, of the programs and facilities available in
the juvenile system, of the emotional and physical maturity of the
juvenile, and expert testimony as to the probabilities of rehabilitation
within the juvenile system as compared with the adult system are all relevant to this issue."8
As will be discussed below, review of the juvenile court's waiver is
extremely limited in scope. This makes the disposition of the transfer
hearing itself quite important. Counsel often enter juvenile cases by
court appointment. Further, the juvenile's counsel is likely to believe that
the juvenile judge and prosecutor are concerned with the welfare of the
child. There is a temptation for counsel to make his own judgment as to
the proper disposition of the juvenile and to act upon that judgment in
his representation of the juvenile. However, the duty to represent a
client zealously 19 may be more critical in a juvenile proceeding than in
other areas. In juvenile matters the court and the juvenile authorities
often work very closely with one another toward what they perceive to
be the "best interest" of the juvenile. If counsel for the juvenile begins to
view himself other than as an advocate, the entire waiver process is likely
to be completed without a critical examination of the merits. Therefore,
counsel for the juvenile should be a zealous advocate of the juvenile's
position 2 0 and should leave questions concerning the "best interest" of
the juvenile to the court. It will be a very unusual case in which counsel
2 1
for a juvenile should advocate waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction.

IV.

CHALLENGING THE JUVENILE COURTS ORDER WAIVING JURISDICTION

A. Motion to Dismiss in the Criminal Trial
It is beyond dispute that a juvenile court order waiving jurisdiction
pursuant to section 211.071 may not be appealed directly. It is an inter22
locutory order from which appeal is unavailable.
18.
T.J.H.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Mo. Juv. CT. R. 118.04 and comments thereto. See also State ex rel.,
v. Bills, 495 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4.15.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 45 and 46 infra.
In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
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Once the waiver order has been issued and criminal prosecution of
the juvenile has commenced in circuit court, the first opportunity to
challenge the order waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is by a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in the criminal case. 23 This
procedure creates a very peculiar form of "review." If the circuit court
finds the waiver procedure of the juvenile court defective in any particular, it should grant the defendant's motion to dismiss because the circuit
court is without jurisdiction to proceed. 24 The net effect is that one trial
court is reviewing the decision of another. This is a problem in smaller
Missouri circuits where the same judge may sit both in the criminal division and in the juvenile division. The solution for a juvenile's counsel in
that situation is to move for a change of venue in the criminal case.
Some judges do not realize that when the motion to dismiss is filed they
may look behind the order waiving jurisdiction to the procedures of the
waiver hearing and the evidence presented there. Moreover, because an
order cannot be appealed until after the criminal trial is completed,
there is a temptation for the judge to resolve all doubt in favor of the
validity of the order. A partial solution to this problem may be for the
juvenile's counsel to file detailed suggestions in support of his motion to
dismiss. These suggestions should show not only the alleged defects in
the section 211.071 procedures, but also the propriety and necessity of
the criminal court's review of the juvenile court's order, 25 the procedures used at the h6aring, the court's substantive reasons for transfer,
and the evidence in support of those reasons. In the absence of wellreasoned and supported suggestions in support of the motion, the criminal court is likely to deny the motion summarily. It should be added
that for reasons discussed below "review" by means of a motion to dismiss is in some respects the only satisfactory method of challenging the
waiver order. Therefore, it should be pursued diligently.
There is some language in Missouri case law suggesting that the filing of a motion to dismiss in the criminal prosecution is a condition
precedent to any subsequent challenge to the waiver proceedings. InJefferson v. State 26 the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder.
He appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court from a denial of his motion
to vacate the sentence and judgment. The basis of the motion was that
the procedure at the waiver hearing was constitutionally defective under
the standards of Kent, 27 In re Gault, 2 and Black v. United States. 29 The

23. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.06.
24. § 211.031, RSMo 1969.
25. This showing is grounded in § 211.031, RSMo 1969, granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the juvenile court unless that jurisdiction is waived by the procedure outlined in § 211.071, RSMo 1969.
26. 442 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1969).
27. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
28. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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court briefly reviewed the waiver procedure and concluded thatit probably was constitutionally defective. However, the court affirmed the conviction. The waiver hearing had taken place in 1957, before the decision
in Kent.30 The Missouri court could have based its decision upon a refusal to give Kent retrospective effect, but declined to use this ground."1
Instead, the court found that the issues had been waived by the defendant: "He ...waived any objections he might otherwise have had to the
proceedings in the juvenile court when . . . he failed to file a motion in
32
the general criminal division requesting dismissal of the information."
The issues were held to be waived, even though the decisions of Gault,
Kent, and Black were, at the time of the criminal trial, some eight years
in the future. The court distinguished Kent, Black, and Gault by observing that "in all three cases defendant unsuccessfully protested and objected to the ... proceedings in the juvenile court and in none of them
did he submit to or acquiesce in or in any way waive the deficiencies in
33
the juvenile proceedings."
The effect of Jefferson may be that the filing of a motion to dismiss
has become a condition precedent to obtaining any subsequent review of
the juvenile court order. If the procedure followed by the juvenile court
was defective, the juvenile court had no jurisdiction under the Missouri
statutory scheme. The Missouri Supreme Court's basis for the holding
that a jurisdictional defect had been waived is unclear. Perhaps if the
argument was placed directly before the court, the holding would be
overturned. Until such a case is presented to the court, prudent counsel
will file a motion to dismiss in the criminal action if the waiver hearing is
at all suspect.
B. Writ of Prohibition
A second method of challenging a juvenile court's waiver order is
provided by the use of a writ of prohibition. In In re T.J.H. 34 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the juvenile could not appeal directly
from the juvenile court order waiving its jurisdiction because it was not a
final order. After this holding, the same juvenile subsequently sought a
writ of prohibition against the circuit court to prevent its exercise of
jurisdiction. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the writ would lie in
State ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills. 35 The key to the holding was the finding that
the remedy at law was inadequate: "Where ...the court is wholly wanting in jurisdiction to proceed in the case, appeal is not an adequate rem-

30. Kent, note 27 supra, was not decided until 1966.

31. 442 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Mo. 1969).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. En Banc 1972).

35. 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/9
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edy because any action by the court is without authority and causes unwarranted expense and delay to the parties involved." 36 If limited to its
facts, the holding of State ex rel. T.J.H. would provide only a narrow
exception to the policy of In re T.J.H.,37 that no appeal may be had from
the juvenile court waiver order until the criminal trial is completed. In
State ex rel. T.J.H. the order of the juvenile court waiving its jurisdiction
was "void on its face as a matter of law because it gave no statement of
reasons for that determination, in violation of the due process requirements of the United States Supreme Court and this court." 38 In these
special circumstances, the court held that a writ of prohibition would lie.
The court's reasoning in State ex rel. T.J.H. appears to have a greater
potential impact upon the policy of In re T.J.H. The court stated that the
writ would lie wherever the criminal court was "wholly wanting in jurisdiction." Section 211.031 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile
court. Section 211.071 provides the only procedure whereby the juvenile
court can waive its jurisdiction. Thus, if the waiver hearing under Section 211.071 is defective in any particular, it can be argued that the
criminal court is "wholly wanting in jurisdiction" and that a writ of prohibition should lie.
Although logically sound, this argument seems unlikely to succeed
because it would mean an effective overruling of the court's policy underlying In re T.J.H.; a defendant would be provided review of the
waiver order before a final judgment in the criminal case. Instead, the
court seems to have limited the use of the writ of prohibition to juvenile
court waiver orders which are facially void. A "writ of prohibition goes
to the sufficiency of the order to transfer, not to its correctness." 39 The
limitation is a difficult one to understand. A writ of prohibition is supposed to lie to test jurisdiction of the criminal court to proceed. It is an
unusual definition of jurisdiction which is limited to errors apparent on
the face of the order. It is unclear which errors go to the "sufficiency" of
an order and which go only to its "correctness." It is clear that a failure
to state any reasons for the transfer order goes to its sufficiency. 40 At
the opposite side of the continuum, it seems unlikely that a failure of the
evidence to support the findings would go to the sufficiency of the order.41 Failure to hold a proper investigation, giving reasons for the
36. Id. at 79.
37. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
88. 504 S.W. 2d at 79.
39. Id.

40. Id. The origin of the substantive requirement is Kent v. United States,

383 U.S. 541 (1966).

41. The author was involved in the latter stages of a case arising in New
Madrid County. After the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction and a motion to
dismiss in the criminal trial had been denied, a writ of prohibition was sought
against the judge in the criminal case. The writ alleged that the circuit court was
without jurisdiction because: (1) the reasons stated by the juvenile court for waivPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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waiver of jurisdiction which are improper either under the statute, the
Supreme Court rule, or the case law, failure to afford counsel to a
juvenile, or failure to give notice are all examples of error which under
the rule of In re T.J.H. may or may not be subject to challenge by the
use of a writ of prohibition. This indicates that the Missouri Supreme
Court will draw a line somewhere within this gray area, but it is unclear
where it will be drawn.
C. Appeal from a Conviction in the Criminal Trial
The third method of challenging a juvenile court's waiver order is to
wait for a verdict in the criminal trial and take an appeal assigning as
error the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. 42 Assuming that all issues are
preserved for appeal, this method of challenging the waiver order provides substantively the most complete review. From a practical standpoint,
however, post-conviction appeal is often the least desirable form of challenge. In order to obtain this appeal, the juvenile is subjected to an adult
criminal trial. Even if the appeal is ultimately successful and the defendant is returned to the juvenile system, he has undergone the stigmatizaquite possibly a substantial period of
tion of an adult criminal trial and
43
incarceration with adult felons.
The other problem of post-conviction appeal is suggested by Judge
Seiler's concurring opinion inJefferson v. State. 44 The majority in Jefferson held that the defendant juvenile had waived any constitutional defects in the waiver procedure by failing to file a motion to dismiss in the
general criminal division. Judge Seiler's concurrence was based on the
fact that at the time of the appeal, the defendant was twenty-seven years
old and therefore no longer within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Judge Seiler did not explain why this fact made a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights innocuous. If this view represents the law in
Missouri, 45 the implications for a juvenile defendant are ominous. He
ing its jurisdiction were contrary to the statutory and case law of Missouri; (2)
the reasons given for the waiver were mere conclusions, not supported by findings of fact; (3) the reasons given for waiver were not supported by the evidence;
and (4) no social investigation or report was made. In State ex rel. Glynn Owens
v. Craig, No. 10615 (Mo. App., D. Spr. Jan. 1977) the court of appeals granted
the writ of prohibition. Unfortunately the writ was issued without an opinion
and the reasons for the court granting the writ remain a matter of speculation.
42. Not discussed here is the use of federal habeas corpus. In an appropriate
case this remedy should be considered by a juvenile's counsel.
43. Avoidance of criminal trials and incarceration of juveniles are two of the
primary purposes of the juvenile codes. See, e.g., F. FAUsT & P. BRANTINGHNIM,
JUVENILE JUSTIcE PImLOSOPHY (1974); Davis, The JurisdictionalDilemma of the Juvenile
Court, 51 N.C.L. REV. 195 (1972); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
44. 442 S.W.2d 6, 14 (Mo. 1969).
45. Apparently this is not the law in all jurisdictions. See Note, 4 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 405 (1974).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/9
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cannot obtain effective appellate review until he is tried and convicted. 46 Even if it is determined that the juvenile court improperly
waived its jurisdiction, the juvenile would have no remedy if he has
passed the jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile code. This will create a
premium on delay by the prosecutor. Because it is more likely to be an
older juvenile who is tried as an adult,47 Judge Seiler's reasoning provides the prosecutor with a method for effective insulation from appellate review.
There is one situation where it might be advantageous for a juvenile
to wait for a post-conviction appeal.48 This would occur if the juvenile
has an objection to the waiver proceedings and a defense to the charges
in the criminal prosecution. In circuit court, because of his right to a
jury and to more formal courtroom procedures, the juvenile might have
a better chance for a favorable verdict than he would in juvenile
court. 49 If his defense on the merits is successful then he would obviously not want to appeal the waiver order. If, however, he loses on the
merits, he could appeal alleging that the circuit court was without jurisdiction. If his claim for relief is recognized, the circuit court's conviction
and sentence will be vacated and the case remanded to the juvenile court
where he will have a second chance to avoid waiver.
V. WHO Is NOT A PROPER SUBJECT To BE DEALT
WITH UNDER THE JUVENILE CODE

Section 211.071 requires that if the juvenile court's jurisdiction is to
be waived, there must be a finding that the juvenile is not a proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code. In theory, this required
finding should be a limit on the ability of a juvenile court to waive its
jurisdiction. In practice, however, it has not placed a limit on the
juvenile courts at all. No Missouri case has ever held that a juvenile court
erred in considering or failing to consider any particular factor or factors. The reason for this approach stems from a belief in the juvenile
area that a judge should be free to dispense individualized justice. The
effect of this seemingly unlimited discretion on the juvenile's counsel is
twofold. First, it is unclear what factors counsel should argue on behalf
of his client at the waiver hearing. Second, if the juvenile court's decision
is to waive jurisdiction, counsel has no substantive basis for a challenge
to that action.
46. The exception to this rule is the use of a writ of prohibition. However, as
suggested infra it is probable that the writ of prohibition will provide little meaningful review. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
47. In Missouri the juvenile must be at least 14. § 211.071, RSMo 1969.
48. It should, however, be remembered that even if this result is desired, it
may be necessary to make a motion to dismiss in the criminal case. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
49. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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In State v. Williams 50 the defendant argued that the lack of statutory
standards and the failure of the courts to develop a meaningful definition of who is a "proper subject" to be dealt with under the juvenile code
rendered the statute constitutionally vague. The Missouri Supreme
Court noted that the juvenile code was passed as an integrated and
comprehensive statutory scheme. The court indicated that if the waiver
statute was not in the juvenile code the Missouri Legislature would not
have been willing to enact the remainder of the act. The court concluded that if section 211.071 were held invalid, they would be constrained to declare the entire juvenile code invalid. Thus, if a juvenile
defendant successfully challenged section 211.071 on constitutional
grounds, he then would be tried as an adult.5 1 Therefore, the language
in this case should be carefully examined before a constitutional attack is
made upon section 211.071.
This entire argument, however, was dictum as the court ultimately
concluded that the statute was not vague: "The requirement that the
juvenile court find 'such child ... is not a proper subject to be dealt
with' under the Juvenile Code is a direction that the Court look to the
5 2
other provisions of the Juvenile Code in making that determination."
This, of course, adds little to an understanding of who is not a proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code. It does not state which
sections of the code must be scrutinized. In Williams the court looked to
section 211.011, which states that the purpose of the code is to: "facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court and to provide such care, guidance and control, 'as
will conduce to the child's welfare and the best interest of the State.' 1 5 3
The court seems to have stated little more than the obvious. The interests of both society and the juvenile must be considered. The exact
nature of those interests and how they are to be balanced is not made
clear.
Other Missouri cases dealing with section 211.071 have been of little
help in defining who is a proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile code. Most decisions state in dictum the appropriate factors to be
considered. Perhaps the most clearly written of these opinions is State ex
rel. T.J.H. v. Bills,54 the third of the "T.J.H. trilogy." The Missouri Court
of Appeals, Kansas City District, stated:

50. 473 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1971).
51. This result would necessarily follow. In the absence of a juvenile code the
defendant could be tried as an adult. The fact that the juvenile was subject to
transfer means that he must be at least fourteen years old. Therefore, in Missouri he is prima facie capable of possessing criminal intent. State ex rel. Cave v.
Tincher, 258 Mo. 2, 166 S.W. 1028 (En Banc 1914).
52. 473 S.W.2d at 384.
53. Id.
54. 495 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/9
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A juvenile court might reasonably exercise its discretion to relinquish jurisdiction over a child when, from the totality of circumstances, it appears: 1) the child's "age, maturity, experience
and development' are such as to require prosecution under the
general law ... , 2) the nature and seriousness of child's conduct
constitutes a threat to the community . .. , 3) the conduct was
committed in a violent and vicious manner .. ., 4) there is
reasonable likelihood that like future conduct will not be deterred by continuing the child under the "care, protection, and
discipline" of the juvenile process ....

55

These factors, in combination with any factor which tends to predict the
suitability or unsuitability of the juvenile law process for rehabilitation of
the child are relevant 56 to the determination of whether he is a proper
57
subject to be dealt with under that law.
Perhaps the most thoughtful standards suggested are those given by
the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States.58 The Court
stated that the juvenile court should consider:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or gainst
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense
in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults ....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile including
previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts in other jurisdictions,
prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospect s for adequate protection of the public and the
likeliloodof reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile ...by
the use of procedures, services,
and facilities currently avail59
able to the Juvenile Court.
These criteria are not controlling in Missouri. They were given as an
appendix to the opinion as an example of factors that should be consid-

55. Id. at 728.
56. Id. at 728. See State v. Thompson, 502 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1973) and State
v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966) for other Missouri cases which suggest
appropriate factors to consider in a waiver hearing.
57. See also Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. En Banc 1971); State ex
rel. D-V- v. Cook, 495 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
58. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
59. Id. at 566-67.
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ered under the District of Columbia statute. However, they are helpful
in pointing out the type of comprehensive judicial interpretation that is
desirable when the statute is silent as are both the District of Columbia
and Missouri statutes.
The various standards suggested in the cases above are helpful to a
juvenile judge who must decide if a juvenile is a proper subject to be
dealt with under the juvenile code. They may also be helpful to the
juvenile's counsel to decide what evidence to introduce on behalf of his
client at a waiver hearing. However, they are of little value to counsel
who wishes to challenge the validity of a waiver hearing on the grounds
that the juvenile court erred in finding that his client was not a proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code; there is no authority in
Missouri suggesting that any of these factors must be considered. Presumably there is a limit to the juvenile court's discretion. However, no
Missouri case has reversed a juvenile court's waiver order either on the
ground that the evidence did not support a finding that the juvenile was
not a proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code, or that the
juvenile court failed to consider certain necessary factors.
The most hopeful development in this respect is in the new Missouri
Juvenile Court Rules that became effective August 1, 1976. They provide that in reaching the decision to waive jurisdiction over the juvenile:
The court shall consider all evidence relevant to whether the
juvenile is a proper subject to be dealt with under the provisions of the J-uvenile Code, including but not limited to:
(1) whether the offense alleged involved viciousness, force or
violence; and
(2) whether the offense alleged is part of a repetitive pattern
of offenses which indicates that the juvenile may be
beyond rehabilitation under the Juvenile Code; and
(3) the record of the juvenile; and
(4) the programs
and facilities available to the juvenile
60
courts.

The official comments to this section suggest that the rule is not
intended to change the substantive law. The comment would seem accurate to the extent that all four of the criteria suggested in the rule are
mentioned in prior Missouri case law. However, the rule is a significant
change in the prior case law in its use of the words "shall consider." If
enforced, this rule would for the first time require a Missouri juvenile
judge to consider particular factors. This should create a more meaningful basis for challenge of a juvenile court order waiving jurisdiction on
the grounds that the judge failed to consider one of the four factors
mentioned in the rule, or that the judge's findings are not supported by
the evidence.
The first two of the rule's four criteria are unambiguous and often
have been suggested by Missouri courts as appropriate criteria to deter60. Mo. Juv. CT. R. 118.04 and comment thereto (emphasis added).
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mine who is a proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code. 61
The third criterion is less clear. It commands the juvenile court to
"examine the record of the juvenile." It is unclear whether this is a reference to the juvenile's court record, or whether it is intended to include
his record with juvenile authorities, police, or school. It probably would
not be error for a juvenile judge to examine any such records. The question is whether under the new rule it would be error for a juvenile court
to fail to consider such records.
The fourth criterion of the new rule requires the juvenile courts to
examine "the programs and facilities available ..... " If the juvenile correctional system does not have the appropriate facility for a particular
juvenile, it is difficult to argue that the juvenile court should retain
jurisdiction. If a juvenile is a risk to himself or to others, society has a
legitimate interest in high security detention. If there is no such facility
available and the danger is real, it may justify prosecution of the juvenile
as an adult. If unlimited funds and the public willingness to spend those
funds on juvenile facilities existed, the juvenile system would have
facilities to deal with the dangerous juvenile offender. Adequate facilities
acute in Missouri regarddo not now exist. This problem is particularly
62
ing the dangerous female juvenile offender.
Although this criterion is relevant to the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction in a practical sense, it is potentially open to challenge on "right to
treatment" grounds. The basic concept of this argument is that the lack
of appropriate juvenile facilities should not be a justification for the
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. It could be argued that the state should
be required to provide appropriate juvenile facilities or it should be required not to prosecute the juvenile at all.
The concept of a right to treatment first gained judicial recognition
in Rouse v. Cameron.63 The legal argument is that the law exempts certain persons from criminal responsibility. Although these persons may
not be prosecuted criminally, the state may require confinement in an
institution for treatment. Treatment, it is argued is the quid pro quo for
confinement. 64 In Rouse the court held that if there was inadequate
treatment provided at a facility where such persons were confined, the
confinement itself was unlawful. This argument has reached its most
sophisticated development in the area of mental health. Recently, how-

61. See cases cited notes 56-57 supra.
62. The highest security juvenile facility for females in Missouri is the center
located in Chillicothe. This facility does not even have a fence surrounding the
grounds.
63. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64. For a full and critical development of this argument see Renn, The Right
to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 477 (1973).
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ever, there has been argument for the extension of the right to treat65
ment to the juvenile area.
It would seem, however, that the right to treatment argument would
have little chance of success in a waiver hearing under Missouri law.
There is a substantial distinction between the way the Missouri Supreme
Court has conceptualized the position of a juvenile charged with commission of a crime and the way the District of Columbia Circuit Court in
Rouse viewed the position of the mental patient. The court in Rouse saw
treatment as the quid pro quo for confinement. The mental patient's condition exempted him from criminal responsibility. In contrast, the Missouri Supreme Coiurt seems to view treatment within the juvenile system
as a substitute for criminal responsibility. The juvenile court's exclusive
jurisdiction over a juvenile charged with an act which but for the
juvenile code would be a crime is a matter of legislative grace which vests
no rights in the juvenile. The state, therefore, has a right to confine such
a juvenile with or without treatment; treatment is not the quid pro quo of
confinement.
The Missouri Supreme Court's view of the juvenile justice system
was evident in State v. Williams, 66 where the court was presented with a
"constitutional attack on the waiver statute. In that opinion, the court
stated that if it were to hold the waiver procedure unconstitutional, it
also would void the section granting jurisdiction to the juvenile courts, a,
thereby causing all juveniles to be tried as adults. 68 The logic of this
approach would be clearly inconsistent with a recognition of a juvenile's
right to treatment in a waiver situation. If the Missouri Supreme Court
is faced with a right to treatment challenge to the waiver procedure, it
seems likely that it will uphold the right of the juvenile courts to waive
their jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are two related problems facing a juvenile's attorney in a
waiver hearing: the lack of an adequate method to challenge the juvenile
court's order waiving jurisdiction, and the lack of substantive standards
to be used by the court in reaching the waiver decision. As discussed
above, the only substantively satisfactory method of challenging a
juvenile court order waiving jurisdiction is to take an appeal from a conviction in the criminal trial. The problem with this procedure is that it is
much too slow. The alternative remedy is the writ of prohibition. It has
the advantage of speed but is very limited in its scope. 69 The three
65. Id. at 478-79. See also Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 U.
Rzv. 1134 (1967).
66. 473 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1971).
67. § 211.071, RSMo 1969.
68. 473 S.W.2d at 383-84.
69. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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T.J.H. cases 70 suggest that, absent an outright judicial reversal, the solution to the juvenile's dilemma is unlikely to be resolved in the courts.
Without an effective method to challenge the juvenile court's order, consistency in the substantive standards of waiver will not develop. Absent
an expansion of the limits of State ex rel. T.J.H. 71 or a complete judicial
reversal of In re T.J.H., the only avenue of resolution will be by a legislative act declaring the order of the juvenile court waiving its jurisdiction
to be a final appealable order.
The lack of an adequate method of challenging a juvenile court's
waiver order has helped to create the lack of substantive standards. A
number of Missouri cases establish appropriate factors for consideration,
but no case has held that a court must consider any particular factor.
Moreover, the standard of proof required at the waiver hearing is not
entirely clear.72 It is suggested that a legislative act declaring the waiver
order final for purpose of appeal would create a meaningful opportunity for appeal, and this in turn would lead to more definite substantive
standards.
ROBERT

S.

BOGARD

70. See text accompanying notes 22-38 supra.
71. See part IV B of this comment.
72. Apparently a defendant must show an abuse of discretion. See Jefferson
v. State, 442 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1969).
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